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CONTENTS
• The Third WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in November 1999 is expected to pave the way to the ninth multi-
lateral round of trade negotiations, labelled Millennium Round (MR). Like the preceding Uruguay Round (UR), it will
have the twin targets of preventing domestic measures from discriminating against foreign supply and of dismantling
border measures such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
• The core challenge of the MR will be to defend the WTO framework against efforts to sacrifice its genuine target of
guaranteeing and enforcing access to markets by compromising this target with other targets such as protecting the
environment, workers' rights, foreign investors' rights and competition. The GATT experience with a contradictory
and inefficient mixture of aid targets (special treatment for developing countries and least-developed countries) and
trade principles (non-discrimination between all WTO member states) underlines the importance of clearly separat-
ing targets, instruments and responsibilities of actors through different institutional set-ups instead of forcing them
into a single framework. This holds especially for the protection of the environment and of workers' rights, where ex-
isting frameworks should be used and/or new frameworks be founded. For competition and investment, existing ele-
ments of the WTO can be used to keep markets open and to level the playing field between foreign and domestic in-
vestors.
• Liberalising trade in services and enforcing free access to service markets through the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) will be the most important concrete liberalisation objective in the MR. As the GATS principle is
bottom-up (service-industry-specific liberalisation with many loopholes) while the GATT principle for goods is top-
down (across-the-board cut of border measures), the best liberalisation results would be achieved if the top-down
principle could be applied to services as much as possible. Linking services to goods as joint products bound to
GATT rules and/or defining services as goods wherever possible (for instance, in e-commerce) could be instrumen-
tal to anchor the top-down principle in services.
• In traditionally highly protected sectors with special entitlements like agriculture and textiles (including clothing), the
MR must counter efforts of big players like the EU and partly the US to play for time by postponing UR commitments
to the latest possible date. In doing so, they will deliberately create an adjustment jam, which would trigger requests
for further safeguards. Should the WTO fail to discipline the players in these sectors, frustration in developing coun-
tries can weld the vast majority of WTO members into a stumbling block against the MR.
• Further needs to reform the current WTO framework can be identified in disciplining mushrooming regional integra-
tion schemes, which undermine the most-favoured nation treatment principle, in dismantling still existing tariff escala-
tion, which discriminates against manufactured goods exporters, in fundamentally redressing the abuse of contingent
protection measures such as anti-dumping and safeguards and, finally, in solving the still pending issue of China's
accession to the WTO. The MR without China refutes the WTO's claim to be a universal institution.
• In a mercantilist world, negotiation strategies matter. Notwithstanding the lack of a fast-track mandate for the US
administration, it seems that the US together with Asian countries prefer sector-specific negotiations with a focus on
agriculture, services, and government procurement. In contrast, the EU prefers negotiations on all issues in a so-
called comprehensive round. Developing countries still hesitate to participate at all but their hesitancy can prove to
be a promising strategy to push the EU and the US toward accelerating the implementation of UR commitments. All
participants will experience that there are first-mover advantages and that leapfrogging technological progress in the
cross-border movement of persons, goods and services will impose high costs on those who get stuck in old-style
nitty-gritty trade diplomacy.
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Six years after the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round (UR), the Third WTO Ministerial Con-
ference in Seattle in November 1999 is intended
to lay the foundations for the ninth round of
multilateral trade negotiations since the foun-
dation of GATT in 1947. As this round will
lead the multilateral trading system into the new
millennium, it has been named Millennium
Round (MR) as a working label.
It is hardly an exaggeration to argue that a
substantial work has been done between the two
rounds. After 1995, for instance, unfinished UR
agenda items were concluded in basic telecom-
munications and financial services, and new
sector-specific negotiations were started in in-
formation technology products, aiming at the
elimination of tariffs on a broad range of prod-
ucts. But aside from such negotiations, the in-
creasing number of dispute settlement proce-
dures has revealed areas where more precise
wording has become necessary to avoid even
more such disputes in the future.
Despite such legal wrangling, the bottom line
of the UR results seems to be reflected in the
current account. That is, while the capital trans-
actions in the balance of payments became ex-
posed to volatility and shocks during the finan-
cial crises of the past few years, the current ac-
count transactions revealed a remarkable stabil-
ity. Some argue that this was due to the legal
discipline which the Contracting Parties had to
comply to. Such a view neglects that the trading
system can also be exposed to volatility and
shocks and that stability can be transitory.
Volatility and shocks might arise less from gen-
eral political resistance against open markets,
which seems to have declined in recent years,
but more from occasionally emerging protec-
tionist forces which are fuelled, for instance, by
a widening gap between the US current account
deficit and the Japanese and EU current account
surpluses. The view that the buoyant US market
has been assuming the role of the "world's im-
porter of last resort" by absorbing the post-cri-
sis export expansion of emerging Asian markets
(which actually has not yet fully started) and
that the two other major, but slowly growing
markets shy away from "burden sharing", could
easily culminate in protectionist actions and re-
taliatory responses. It is for this reason that
launching a new round is timely in order to
contain protectionist forces when the export ex-
pansion should reveal its full strength.
1
There are three aspects which will influence
the agenda of the MR from the very beginning.
First, as the implementation of the UR com-
mitments will be finalised much later than the
start of the new round, there is some overlap-
ping between the UR and the MR. The MR has
to take account of some UR commitments, for
instance, the liberalisation of trade in textiles
and clothing until year 2005 and the implemen-
tation of UR commitments to the trade in agri-
culture, which are scheduled to begin in year
2000. Hence, part of the MR eventually will
have to cope with "play for time"-strategies of
major Contracting Parties in addition to the new
"headline" issues. It cannot be excluded that
trading partners abuse the evergreen issues as
hostages for receiving specific privileges in the
headline issues or vice versa.
Second, the complexity and heterogeneity of
issues increases. This is a continuation of the.
trend which started at the UR in which, unlike
the preceding rounds, tariff cuts for the first
time were no longer in the centre of negotia-
tions. This trend is not only due to splintering
the negotiations into specific core sectors like
agriculture and textiles or to including intellec-
tual property rights (TRIPs) and trade-related
measures (TRIMs). Heterogeneity and com-
plexity is primarily due to the shift in attention
from goods to services as the big remaining
stumbling block to freer trade and to the fact
that the dismantling of qualitative (non-numeri-
cal) border barriers often escapes quantification
beyond the bottom line of the reciprocity pre-
requisite. Thus, Contracting Parties who are un-
Remark: The author would like to thank Dean Spinanger
and Jorg-Volker Schrader for critical comments
on earlier drafts.
To arrest never-ending protectionist tendencies is the
key reason for sustaining the liberalisation momen-
tum as argued by the so-called bicycle theory
(Bergsten 1999).able to quantify the value of their own liberali-
sation concessions might be reluctant to accept
other Parties' concessions, thereby bringing the
negotiations in a stalemate situation. The initial
refusal of the United States in the post-UR pe-
riod to accept concessions offered by Asian
countries in financial services as an equivalent
to own offers bears witness to the implications
of non-quantitative trade barriers for speedy ne-
gotiations, which are still subject to the reci-
procity criterion.
The third reason is perhaps the most far-
reaching one: For both trade in goods and ser-
vices, a shift in priorities from trade liberalisa-
tion to market access can be identified. As con-
cerns merchandise trade on the one hand, tariff
barriers and quantitative restrictions in particu-
lar as well as border measures in general have
declined substantially. On the other hand, tech-
nical barriers such as health and phyto- sanitary
standards as well as anti-dumping measures to-
day have emerged as the major hurdles to ac-
cessing foreign markets. As concerns trade in
services, border measures are relatively unim-
portant compared to domestic measures which
restrict foreigners' presence in domestic mar-
kets or prevent residents from buying services
in foreign markets unrestrictedly.
The crucial shift from trade liberalisation to
market access with its impacts upon various
policies and sectors will be discussed in more
detail in Section II. Section III is devoted to the
so-called evergreen issues, i.e. the unfinished
agenda items from previous rounds. Section IV
discusses likely negotiation strategies of the
most important actors, which reflect a mercan-
tilist tone in terms of ensuring best access to
potential export markets while keeping conces-
sions for access to the domestic markets at bay.
Section V concludes with an optimistic note. It
points out that technological innovations in
moving goods, people and knowledge across
borders can easily establish a new bottom line
of first-mover advantages for traders. Against
this bottom line, responsive tactics from mer-
cantilists might still be able to play for time in
order to postpone and slow down adjustment.
However, they will not succeed in stopping the
caravan of those who gain from freer trade and
have technology on their side.
II. The Headline MR Issue: How
to Defend Market Access
against the Abuse of Domestic
Policies
1. Services: The GATT "Swallowing"
the GATS?
Until the UR, multilateral trade negotiations
were based on the top-down principle: Tariff
cuts for all industrial goods (except for specifi-
cally excluded products like textiles, clothing
and processed agricultural goods) were pro-
posed either across the board or with a non-lin-
ear tariff-cutting formula. Overall, common prin-
ciples toward dismantling border measures were
agreed upon. In the same vein, quantitative trade
restrictions were generally banned; the use of
domestic subsidies was restricted to non-discri-
minatory purposes in compliance with national
treatment; and the application of contingent
trade measures such as anti-dumping measures,
safeguard clauses and countervailing duties was
limited to strictly defined cases which were
each subject to a non-arbitrary transparent pro-
cedure.
2 Price equivalents of non-tariff meas-
ures were calculated to allow for comparisons
with tariffs. The entire effort of the top-down
principle was to focus the GATT on its prime
instrument of discrimination between domestic
and foreign suppliers — the tariff. By putting a
clear price tag on trade-restricting measures,
transparency was facilitated, thus raising hur-
dles for domestic vested interests to defend and
justify their claims for protection. Furthermore,
the reciprocity requirement as a negotiation prin-
ciple in a political environment of disciplined
mercantilism could be met with such price tags
becoming available and accepted.
Compared to the GATT, the situation in the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
could not be more different. The GATS principle
is bottom-up. Contracting Parties place those
services they are prepared to liberalise on a
2 It is commonly acknowledged among free traders that
these limits could be drawn much more narrowly. See
Leidy (1994)."positive" list. The remaining services are ex-
cluded from liberalisation. Furthermore, trade-re-
stricting measures maintained for those services
listed for liberalisation (Krancke 1998) are
placed on a "negative" list. To some extent, this
procedure pays tribute to the peculiarities of non-
factor services, i.e. the dominance of qualitative
domestic measures over quantitative border
measures and the heterogeneity of non-factor
services. However, it also reflects strong resis-
tance to the opening of service industries to inter-
national competition for obvious reasons. In
many industrialised countries, such industries
have enjoyed a level of protection similar to
other highly protected sectors such as agriculture.
As a result, resource allocation has become dis-
torted in favour of excessively absorbing the rel-
atively scarce factor, i.e. in this case unskilled
labour. This process has lasted for the entire
post-war period and today coincides with pres-
sures on labour market adjustment due to de-in-
dustrialisation. Therefore, vested interests during
the UR were strong enough to enforce the bot-
tom-up principle which leaves sufficient room to
ensure protection on service sectors against com-
peting imports. Admittedly, the GATS in Art.
XIX specifies a continuation of negotiations on
liberalisation to begin not later than five years
from the date of entry into force (i.e. not later
than year 2000). In addition, negotiations con-
cerning government procurement, subsidies and
safeguard measures have also become obligatory.
Finally, the GATS principle to encourage mutual
recognition of national standards (equivalent to
ex post harmonisation) and its multilateral appli-
cation must be acknowledged as positive steps.
Yet, the bottom-up principle remains the limiting
factor. That means that any significant liberalisa-
tion step forward requires to weaken the bottom-
up principle and to strengthen the top-down prin-
ciple. In other words, the top-down principle is
typical for border measures, while the bottom-up
principle addresses the details of different nation-
al legal rules, for instance, for commercial pres-
ence as a prerequisite of one mode of providing
services, the move of the producer to the con-
sumer.
To speed up liberalisation of trade in serv-
ices, the MR could aim at substituting border
measures for domestic measures. For instance,
Contracting Parties could be entitled to charge
foreigners a fee for allowing them to supply
commercial services domestically, dropping in
return legal restrictions on the presence of for-
eigners. Reducing such fees would then become
subject to negotiations. Moreover, negotiators
could consider either binding as much services
to goods and thus to the GATT provisions or
defining services as goods as much as possible
and then again apply GATT provisions.
The first approach departs from Grubel's
proposition that all traded services are embod-
ied in materials and people and that therefore
"...free trade in goods assumes free trade in
non-factor services. There is no need for a spe-
cial treatment of trade in services under GATT"
(Grubel 1987: 326). While this proposition has
been strongly motivated by the target to apply
the same rules for services as for goods and to
maintain the liberalisation momentum and
transparency of the trading system, it is unten-
able in its radical form (Arndt 1989: 4). Many
services are not embodied in materials or peo-
ple but constitute a separate item in terms of
dissemination of knowledge or information.
However, if the benefits from GATT provisions
for goods are threatened to be impaired or nul-
lified due to discriminatory measures in goods-
related services such as transport, Contracting
Parties should be allowed to demand that such
services are subject to the same trade policy
provisions as for goods. In short, one would
establish a common policy treatment for a joint
product consisting of a good plus a service.
The other approach is of more recent nature
and stems from modern telecommunication de-
vices. At the Second WTO Ministerial Confer-
ence in Geneva in May 1998, a decision was
taken to continue not to impose tariffs on elec-
tronic transmission (WTO 1999a). While tariff
collection was never intended nor thought to be
feasible, the United States substantiated this de-
cision by proposing to bind it as a standstill
commitment on duty-free trade in electronic
transmission. If the point of departure has been
to argue that electronic transmission of infor-
mation ultimately can (but must not necessarily)
acquire a tangible form, then electronic trans-mission includes the possibility to deliver goods
such as designs, cards, movies, books or music.
This transmission should then be bound to the
rules which are relevant for this tangible form
in order to treat the intangible form and the
tangible form equally. These rules would be
under the GATT and its ban of quantitative re-
strictions, and not under the weaker GATS.
Both ways would be instrumental to generally
anchor top-down rules of non-discrimination
for services and would help to refocus the trad-
ing system on border measures.
It goes without saying that partner countries
particularly competitive in exporting "goods"
under the intangible form would find the pos-
sibility attractive to subsume intangibles under
the GATT. However, the more operational issue
of how to place customs officers in the internet
in order to collect tariffs remains unsolved.
2. Environmental and Social Stan-
dards in the WTO: Barking up
the Wrong Tree
Enforcing environmental and social standards
which are consistent with absorptive capacities,
preferences and income levels of countries is a
legitimate concern. Since countries differ in
these fundamentals, so do domestic environ-
mental and social policies. Policies impact upon
factor costs and thus may drive a wedge be-
tween competing goods produced under differ-
ent policy conditions. Is there then a case for
levelling the playing field through forced har-
monisation by using trade measures against
"sub-standards"? The borderline to be drawn is
between the environmental and social standards
having purely domestic implications on the one
hand and those having cross-border spillovers
on the other hand (Siebert 1996; Langhammer
1997).
In the purely domestic case, there are two ar-
guments supporting trade measures. The first ar-
gument is to equalise the pollution tax over all
WTO Contracting Parties through trade measures
in order to countervail "unfair" competition
through "environmental and social dumping".
This argument is misleading, since it confuses
the universal rule of the polluter-pays principle
with a uniform pollution tax rate (Bhagwati
1999). To meet the former rule would be effi-
cient but this does not require that the latter is
fulfilled. With differences in fundamentals, the
tax rate will be different "for the same carci-
nogen in the same industry" (Bhagwati 1999).
The second argument relates to the "race to the
bottom": sound policies in some countries are
feared to be undermined by unsound policies in
other countries, which thus attract "dirty" indus-
tries or industrialists eager to exploit labour. Theo-
retically, the argument is not unidirectional: there
could be also races to the top if strict policies
meet the preferences of people for environment
protection and workers' rights. If races to the
bottom should actually occur, host countries
would rapidly impose a tax on inflowing capital
in order to stop the degradation of human and
environmental capital. Should such taxes not be
levied, the adequate policy measures should be
targeted to correct this suboptimality directly
rather than taxing trade (Wilson 1996). However,
the empirical validity of this argument is not
strong. Either differences in the pollution tax are
overshadowed by other locational factors to the
detriment of countries with a low tax rate, or dif-
ferences in tax rates are marginal. This evidence
seems to hold both for environmental and social
standards (Beghin et al. 1994; Bhagwati 1999).
Alternative policy measures available as trade
policies are either mandatory or voluntary codes
to induce multinationals to adopt home country
standards when going abroad or to initiate private
competition in certificates and labels and leave it
to the consumer to decide. For the latter, how-
ever, it is important to note that this competition
should be outside governmental actions and that
therefore governments should not privilege spe-
cific labels.
The case with cross-border spillovers is truly
a thorny one which will be high on the agenda
of the Millennium Round. Principally, trade
measures can address negative spillovers. Yet,
the current WTO understanding is such that these
measures should be compared with alternative
policy measures (including compensation pay-
ments and emission certificate auctioning) and,
if applied, should be non-discriminatory, leastdistortive to trade and subject to limits in scope
and time. Negative spillovers may arise, for in-
stance, for consumers if imports cause physical
damages to them. The recent controversies be-
tween the United States and the European Union
on possible consumer damages from consuming
genetically modified or hormone-treated food
has revealed the degree of uncertainty on long-
term health effects of food consumption and to
some extent also the degree of arbitrariness and
vested interests as imports compete with do-
mestic substitutes produced under different
standards.
Dispute settlement decisions under the WTO
have always stressed equal treatment of imports
and domestic production if both show the same
effects on health, for instance in tobacco con-
sumption. However, consumer spillovers provide
clearer policy guidelines than cross-border pro-
ducer externalities, which arise from so-called
process and production methods (PPM) objec-
tions.
3 Famous PPM examples of dispute settle-
ment have been the dolphin-tuna and turtle-
shrimp cases. In these cases, the WTO has op-
posed trade measures which aim to enforce
PPMs that do not affect the characteristics of a
product (Low 1998). However, it is evident that
the pressure for harmonising national PPMs in-
ternationally rather than mutually recognising
different national standards intensifies. In this re-
spect, Art. XX GATT opens legal opportunities
to ensure resource conservation by means of
trade measures under the above-cited prerequi-
sites of non-discrimination (equal treatment of
imports and domestic production) and minimisa-
tion of the negative effects on trade. Concerning
PPM objections, motivation to dispute other trad-
ing partner's PPMs can be labelled either "sel-
fish" if competing domestic production are to be
protected. Alternatively, the motivation would be
"emotional", "altruistic" or "psychological" if no
PPM problems stem from the GATT principle of non-
discrimination between imports and "like" domestic
products (national treatment). The similarity of prod-
ucts, however, is only defined according to the physi-
cal pecularities of products and not according to the
production method. Hence the national treatment
principle does not allow to discriminate between sim-
ilar products competing in the same market but pro-
duced with technologies using different intensities of
environment.
domestic production is involved, but if lower
time preference rates in importing countries
(compared to producing countries) lead to con-
cerns about the depletion of the natural capital
stock and to campaigns against imports. Such
"emotional" spillovers have strongly influenced
the debate on defending minimum social stan-
dards by the threat to impose trade measures as
an ultima ratio.
Should "emotional" spillovers, however, be-
come a legitimate reason for imposing trade
measures, environmentalists and non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) defending social
standards risk to kill a cash cow and to bark up
the wrong tree. As concerns the risk to kill a cash
cow, it has been shown and witnessed time and
again that freer trade offers poor countries the
opportunity to catch up, to gain income and thus
to collect financial resources, which are needed
to implement resource-saving technologies. Like-
wise, it is known that openness promotes the in-
flow of new ideas and goods and thus will also
shape attitudes and preferences of people toward
the rising demand for resource-preserving goods
and better social standards. Sustainable income
increases, such is the message and experience,
are only possible with a well-educated and high-
ly motivated workforce and with a natural capital
stock which is not irreversibly degraded.
As concerns the risk to bark up the wrong
tree, mixing trade policy with environmental
policy under the WTO roof may lead the insti-
tution into the same dilemma which the GATT
incurred when aid targets and trade policies
were mixed under the infant industry argument
(Art. XVIII GATT) and special and differential
treatment (Enabling Clause of 1979). This di-
lemma and the costs involved in terms of
reaching a target half-way with inappropriate
instruments and high opportunity costs are due
to the violation of the assignment rule: There
should be one institution responsible for achiev-
ing one target instead of two or more. Unlike in
the GATT, there should not be distribution tar-
gets assigned to an institution which is designed
to achieve allocation targets.
4 Nor should there
This is exactly the dilemma with the EU banana pol-
icy. This policy is designed to redistribute income by
abusing trade policies. It has been convincingly10
be an institution facing a trade-off between pro-
tecting the environment and enforcing the non-
discrimination principle in international trade.
Environmentalists and social rights' defend-
ers would therefore be well advised not to bark
up the wrong tree called WTO. Instead, they
should head for special institutional set-ups ex-
clusively designed to serve these purposes and
endowed with the similar toolbox as the WTO
to seek compliance with basic principles on the
member countries' side. The ILO is the appro-
priate institution for subjecting countries to a
multilateral discipline in labour market condi-
tions in the same vein as the WTO does it for
trade. Until now, this division of labour be-
tween the WTO and the ILO has been the
common understanding reached at the Singa-
pore Ministerial Meeting. Should the ILO find
social aspects in trade disputes, for instance,
due to Art. XX GATT which under specific
conditions approves trade measures in order to
protect the health of people, these aspects could
be submitted to the ILO for conclusion while
the WTO would adopt ILO's conclusions.
5 This
procedure would neatly separate the responsi-
bility of the two institutions.
6
To extend the blueprint from the IMF/WTO
interaction to the environment requires a new
institutional set-up, a WEO (World Environ-
mental Organization), which would commit the
partner countries to basic principles in domestic
environmental policies such as cost internalisa-
shown that a direct financial transfer to banana-pro-
ducing countries with cost disadvantages is more ef-
ficient and cheaper for the taxpayer/consumer than a
product-specific resource transfer via a discrimina-
tory trade policy (Borrell 1996).
-* There is a blueprint of a division of labour between
the WTO and another international institution, the
IMF. Developing countries are entitled to take re-
course to temporary trade restrictions for balance of
payments purposes (BOP) under the GATT. On the
other hand, the dismantling of trade restrictions be-
longs to one of the key foci of IMF-supported pro-
grammes. Therefore, coordination between the two
institutions is necessary to ensure greater coherence
being one of the work tasks agreed upon in the UR. In
praxi, the WTO accepts the IMF assessment of the
appropriateness of BOP-justified restrictions (IMF
1998: 1,24).
" For a discussion of the need to separate different
institutional set-ups see Siebert (1995) and Klodt
(1999).
tion and polluter-pays principle.
7 In addition,
the WEO would oversee international environ-
mental agreements (IEAs) and the trade policy
implications which arise from overlapping
membership in the WTO and the IEAs. Art. XX
GATT would not have to be revised if the as-
signment problem could be solved in the same
way as in the case of Art. XII (balance of pay-
ments provisions). That means that the WEO
would submit its judgments to the WTO con-
cerning the appropriateness of invoking Art.
XX GATT for environmental purposes.
In sum, the proposal to establish a new inter-
national set-up for the environment has been
illustrated by Esty (1994) in the sense that the
Greens were barking up the wrong tree, the
WTO, while underrating the importance of a
multilateral discipline for the protection of the
environment as witnessed by the success of the
GATT. Hence, instead of greening the GATT,
the environment would gain more if the Greens
were to be "GATTed" (Esty 1994: 73).
The alternative, which is more cumbersome
and less comprehensive, is to gradually "de-
velop" environmental law which is consistent
with the trading system through current panel
decisions in the WTO and through reforming
Art. XX GATT and other legal norms concern-
ing the environment in the WTO framework. It
seems that the Working Committee on Trade
and Environment, the work of which will play a
major role in the MR, is heading for the internal
piecemeal solution rather than for delegating
the issue to an external institution. While the
internal solution builds upon previous develop-
ments and thus avoids institutional breaks, it
risks permanent trade-offs between two targets
within an institution which has been designed to
serve one target only. Hence, the internal solu-
tion misses the correct assignment of tasks and
responsibilities.
This proposal is introduced in more detail in Esty
(1994:73-98), who recommends the foundation of a
Global Environmental Organization and addresses
also the fears concerning a new international bureauc-
racy.11
3. Competition Policies in the WTO:
Building upon Existing Rules or
Designing New Ones?
There seems to be a common understanding on
the positive role of opening markets to compe-
tition. Hence, both the removal of border meas-
ures and the enforcement of non-discrimination
principles toward domestic measures such as
subsidies and government procurement can be
labelled pro-competitive. Should the WTO suc-
ceed in furthering trade liberalisation and access
to markets, one could be tempted to call com-
petition policies redundant. Unfortunately, this
is not the end of the story. First, companies op-
erating globally do not tend to see a maximum
of trade as the optimum, but tend to shift the
adjustment burden of opening markets to third
parties by effectively making markets less con-
testable. Concerted actions are appropriate tools
to close markets and to exploit rents above the
price level which would have emerged under
unimpeded competition. Second, governments
may encourage conceited actions for social or
political reasons either by actively promoting
cartel behaviour or by passively accepting such
behaviour through benign neglect, thereby re-
ducing the gains from freer trade. Third, na-
tional competition policies sometimes do not
exist, for instance in many developing coun-
tries, or are sometimes abused as competition-
regulating instruments. Fourth, liberalisation in
specific industries, such as basic telecommuni-
cations and other network industries, may not
hinder suppliers from making markets less con-
testable. Fifth, specific trade measures which
were initially designed to enforce "fair" trade in
countries lacking national competition policies,
have actually become discriminatory and anti-
competitive, such as anti-dumping.
Both private activeness to contain competi-
tion and public indifference toward fighting
concerted actions have led many people to de-
mand multilateral competition rules. Arguments
in favour of such rules come from different
quarters (Hoekman and Mavroidis 1994). First,
it is argued that the lack of national competition
policies, for instance in developing countries,
distorts trade to the detriment of these countries
(and of their trading partners) and that tying the
hands of their politicians internationally would
help the pro-trade lobby groups in such coun-
tries more than a less credible national law. Re-
lated to this argument is a second one. As those
countries lacking competition policies are often
subject to anti-dumping procedures, an inter-
national agreement might be the way to aban-
don such procedures.
8 Third, existing national
competition laws differ from each other (for
instance between the United States and the
European Union), and some deliberately ex-
clude actions against market conduct which dis-
torts trade, for instance export cartels.
9 Interna-
tionally agreed-upon minimum rules for compe-
tition policies could cure such shortcomings.
Fourth, multinational companies operating
under various jurisdictions might choose the
jurisdiction with the lowest degree of pro-com-
petitive discipline and thus circumvent tougher
jurisdictions in order to abuse market power.
Fifth, international rules might also help multi-
national companies to lower transaction costs if
they could operate under a single international
competition set-up.
Overall, the experiences with national com-
petition policies cast doubts on the straightfor-
ward view that such policies promote competi-
tion per se. Hence, one should think twice
whether an international agreement on harmo-
nising national competition laws, assumed it
might be politically feasible, cures the short-
comings of national laws. As doubts have been
strong in recent years, a cautious approach
seems a reasonable starting point for the MR.
This approach would try to use existing WTO
rules and commitments (Hoekman 1996). One
of these rules is the nullification and impair-
ment clause of Art. XXIII: l(b) GATT. It would
allow Contracting Parties to notify cases where
8 The argument has been forcefully put forward in the
case of Central European transition countries where
the adoption of the EU competition rules in the
Europe Agreements helped them to bring anti-dump-
ing procedures against companies originating from
these countries to an end. However, the famous Nor-
way-UK dispute on salmon pricing reveals that even
a well-established competition law may not protect
countries against anti-dumping procedures.
9 For a detailed discussion of different national compe-
tition policies and their impact upon trade, see WTO
(1997).12
governments tolerate anti-competitive behav-
iour of companies through benign neglect or
open support and thereby risk that gains from
WTO membership are lost or reduced for other
parties. Other existing regulations to be used in
this piecemeal approach are the national treat-
ment and the state trading enterprise clauses in
the GATT, the ban on voluntary export restric-
tions, similar export measures, compulsory im-
port cartels in the Safeguards Agreement
1
0 and,
finally, the reference to conditions of competi-
tion between new investment and established
enterprises related to the notification require-
ment of trade-related investment measures
(TRIMs agreement). Such cases may not be
easily enforceable and may therefore be more
an indirect way to address private market power
abuse via filing public tolerance. Yet, it would
help to improve transparency and induce gov-
ernments to legitimate permissive behaviour
toward restrictive business practices of private
companies. A stronger form than simply to no-
tify would be to open the dispute settlement
mechanism to disputes on so-called TRAPs
(trade-related antitrust principles) (Hoekman
1996). A minimum approach confined to trans-
parency would be to widen the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism to trade-related restrictive
business practices. Other possibilities to intro-
duce competition policies to the WTO go fur-
ther than using the existing framework. They
would either try to harmonise national compe-
tition laws at a minimum level
1
1 or to multilat-
eralise existing bilateral agreements on coop-
eration in competition law enforcement. Such
agreements, for instance between the European
Union and the United States or between Canada
and the United States,
1
2 could also comprise the
exchange of specific concessions, for instance
1
0 It is important to note that Art. 11:3 of the Safeguards
Agreement commits Contracting Parties not to en-
courage or support the adoption or maintenance by
public and private enterprises of non-governmental
measures equivalent to those listed in Art. 11:1 ( i.e.
VERs and similar measures on the export and import
side).
This was the approach of a Munich-based group of
competition law experts, publishing a Draft Interna-
tional Anti Trust Code (Fikentscher and Immenga
1995).
1
2 For a detailed description of bilateral agreements, see
WTO (1997: 81-82).
the right to apply national law to companies
under foreign jurisdiction which operate on the
domestic market or the right to be heard if for-
eign companies merge on their home market
and if this affects domestic companies (for in-
stance the merger between Boeing and MDD
affecting Airbus).
The range between a "once and for all" solu-
tion by negotiating an international antitrust
code with joint minimum requirements and the
down-to-earth approach to gradually applying
the existing WTO framework to competition is-
sues is large. For the time being, the latter ap-
proach is more promising. It will benefit from
work done in the 1996 established Working
Group on the Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy.
4. A WTO-Based Multilateral
Agreement on Investment:
In Search of a Public Good
With the conclusion of the TRIMs Agreement,
the multilateral trading order made a first es-
sential step to open the door to investment
policies.
1
3 This step comprises the impact of in-
vestment policies on the direction and volume
of trade (see above) but does not address the
rules under which investors operate in host
countries. In the same year that the WTO began
its operations, the OECD tried to enter the latter
issue by inviting countries to negotiate a Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The
MAI was intended to anchor basic principles
such as MFN and national treatment and to su-
persede the large number of bilateral agree-
ments which by 1997 had increased to more
than 1300. One year later, a special report of the
WTO on trade and investment recommended
the WTO as the only appropriate institution to
manage a shift from bilateral, regional or pluri-
lateral agreements to a global and comprehen-
sive framework with full participation of devel-
oping and least-developed countries (WTO
Other agreements, such as those on services, govern-
ment procurement, TRIPs and subsidies also have in-
vestment provisions but they are not as far-reaching
as in the TRIMs agreement.13
1996: 77-78). In fact, this report touched upon
a major shortcoming of the OECD initiative: it
did not receive a positive response from non-
OECD countries, which obviously feared to be-
come handmaidens of OECD-based multina-
tionals' interests.
By mid-1999, neither the OECD initiative
nor the WTO report's recommendations have
been implemented. The reluctance of develop-
ing countries is still alive but the issue will be
on the agenda of the MR for a number of good
reasons.
First, next to portfolio investment, foreign
direct investment (FDI) has been the most rap-
idly growing entity in international goods and
factor flows in the last decade. It has become
more global in the sense that on average devel-
oping countries as hosts accounted for more than
one-third of annual inflows in the nineties in
contrast to the seventies and eighties when intra-
OECD flows clearly dominated. A further new
element with special importance for the WTO is
that FDI seems to have become more comple-
mentary to trade flows than in the past due to
shifts in relative importance from domestic-mar-
ket-oriented investment to export-market-orient-
ed investment.
1
4 Given that many developing
countries abandoned import substitution policies,
this shift was the logical consequence of changes
in the incentive system toward exports. Second,
the number of bilateral investment agreements
has mushroomed. Mostly, these agreements guar-
antee the free transfer of investment income,
non-expropriation and same access conditions to
sectors as for domestic investors. Similarly, re-
gional integration schemes such as NAFTA,
MERCOSUR and recently ASEAN provide for
rights of establishment not to speak of the EU
Single Market. Interestingly, the majority of
these agreements set conditions for the in-opera-
tion stage but not for the pre-entry stage. Here is
the gap which a multilateral agreement is as-
sumed to fill when anchoring MFN treatment
and national treatment as common pre-stage
principles in national investment regulation.
Third, given the closer link between trade and
The complementary issue of its implications for the
trading system has been discussed in more detail in
WTO (1996: Sections II and V).
FDI, liberalisation achievements in trade can be-
come obsolete if investment regulations continue
to discriminate not only between residents and
non-residents but also between sectors. Hence,
just what past trade liberalisation has achieved to
reduce (but not yet fully abandoned; see Section
III.5 below) — the discrepancy between nominal
and effective subsidisation of individual sectors
— can easily reemerge through discriminatory
industrial policies. Fourth, there is a clear link
between competition policies and investment
policies. Hence, should the WTO succeed in in-
troducing competition issues in the trading order,
the need to anchor the non-discrimination prin-
ciple in investment regulations increases. Fifth,
while in many developing countries the hostile
stance against multinational enterprises of the
seventies has practically disappeared, the recent
rise in FDI flows has alerted NGOs keeping an
observer status in the WTO. They fear that such
a rise has been fuelled by widening gaps in social
and environmental standards, thus leading to "the
race to the bottom". According to the NGOs, a
multilateral agreement while fixing the two
WTO principles should also fix minimum stan-
dards.
These arguments, however, do not necessar-
ily legitimate a MAI established under the roof
of the WTO. One of the main arguments against
it are doubts concerning the public good charac-
ter. FDI are subject to private sector decisions
on the one hand and policy decisions in host
countries on the other hand. Host countries pur-
suing restrictive policies against FDI would be
penalised in terms of being bypassed by foreign
investors. They would lose in the "beauty con-
test" for mobile capital, and the costs of their
policies would be entirely borne by themselves.
This does not legitimate an international agree-
ment. Only to the extent that national invest-
ment policies have negative international spill-
overs can an international agreement play a
genuine role. Such spillovers can be contagion
effects in the sense that a country pursuing
"good" policies is neighboured by countries
pursuing "bad" policies and that the latter poli-
cies impact upon the host through various trans-
mission channels. Clusters of countries with
discouraging investment conditions in Sub-
saharan Africa come to mind when this spill-14
over argument is raised. More frequently, how-
ever, a "bidding war" between finance ministers
is mentioned as a negative spillover. In the
"beauty contest", countries compete with fiscal
and financial incentives, which they legitimate
with positive in-border externalities. Such bid-
ding wars are feared to ruin host countries'
budgets. There are two opposing views against
this argument. First, theoretically, the costs
from ruining the budget can outweigh the gains
from positive externalities for the host country,
and then countries will stop bidding. Further-
more, participating in a bidding war has such
negative allocative implications that countries
which refrain from participation are better off
(Hiemenz and Weiss 1984). Second, the empiri-
cal relevance of incentives vs. fundamentals as
pull factors for FDI has so long been very much
in favour of the fundamentals, though recently
new findings seem to somewhat challenge this
view.
1
5 Overall, the cross-border spillover argu-
ment does not carry far, especially if one con-
cludes that a multilateral agreement would have
to enter deeply into the taxation regulations of
host countries in order to effectively subject
host countries to a multilateral discipline in
granting incentives.
Another argument in favour of multilateral
agreements is directed toward market failure.
Potential hosts with good policies fail to attract
FDI because risk-averse investors extrapolate
past policy failures and downrate the capability
of the government to turn the tide. Obviously,
this is an issue of capital market imperfections,
and it is open to debate whether a commitment
of a government to tie its hands internationally
under a multilateral agreement would be suffi-
cient to cure market imperfections to make
good investment policies sustainable. In many
cases, accession to a multilateral agreement was
necessary but not sufficient for attracting FDI.
Mexico's accession to the GATT in 1986 would
have not been sufficient to attract investors, had
the country not simultaneously made a number
of substantial unilateral reforms in virtually all
policy aspects.
For a discussion of recent empirical literature, see
Hoekman and Saggi (1999).
In conclusion, heading for a multilateral agree-
ment on investment under the WTO roof is an
ambitious endeavour which cannot be easily
launched given the reluctance of developing
countries to the OECD initiative and given the
requirements to fine-tune domestic tax regula-
tions. Moreover, it does not even seem to be
compelling because of doubts concerning its pub-
lic goods character. In many cases, traditional
policies to open markets in trade and capital are
good substitutes, which can be pursued unilater-
ally at short notice. Furthermore, the various
WTO agreements offer ways to bind investment
issues more closely to trade so that at the end of
the day the sum of many small steps would be at
least as beneficial as the big MAI step, but with
the advantage of being more likely to materialise.
III. The Evergreen Issues: Step-
ping Stones or Stumbling
Blocks for Trade Liberali-
sation?
1. Agriculture: Old Problems Mixed
with New Issues
Compared with agriculture, trade-restrictive
measures in other sectors can be labelled mi-
nuscule. Since the beginning of multilateral trade
negotiations and even more since the beginning
of any negotiations on trade liberalisation, agri-
culture benefitted from the heavy hand of public
shelter in industrial countries. To make this
shelter waterproof, governments centred their
measures within the triangle "price/income sup-
port — export subsidies — import protection".
For many years, resistance from trading partners
did not reach a critical mass. Many developing
countries discriminated the domestic agricultural
sector against the manufacturing sector, thus be-
came net importers of agricultural products,
booked a terms of trade gain in terms of (sub-
sidised) lower world market prices to their ac-
count and therefore did not act as lobby groups
to urge for reducing state support in industrial
countries. Given their continuing domestic dis-15
tortions, they also failed to collect the welfare
gains from any small step toward putting state
support in industrial countries under multilateral
discipline.
Such was the situation before the conclusion
of the UR. The UR, however, has substantially
reshaped the policy trend. This trend today points
toward slowly but irreversibly integrating the
agricultural sector in the same straightj acket of
discipline and stepwise liberalisation as other
sectors. A number of events and changes have
contributed to this historical change. First, do-
mestically, both taxpayers and the non-agricul-
tural sector have finally understood the message
that they were paying a high toll in terms of
higher prices, higher tax burden and resource
misallocation. Against these groups, even a well-
organised lobby like the agricultural sector in-
creasingly faced hurdles to legitimate state sup-
port, especially as this support divided the far-
mers into those who gained because of artificial-
ly rising land prices and those landless tenants
who in spite of support saw themselves at the end
of the income scale (Schrader 1998). Second,
specifically the European Union had to cope with
severe budget constraints even without new agri-
cultural producers as prospective members from
Central and Eastern Europe. With these new
members, a radical reform remained the only
viable option. Third, multilaterally, even without
many net-importing developing countries, the
UR saw the Cairns Group emerging as a strong
lobby group pro multilateral discipline in subsi-
disation and better market access for the first
time in the post-war history of trade negotiations.
The Cairns Group found compatriots on the US
side against the European Union and thus put the
European Union in the position of the only
scapegoat should the UR have failed. It was the
European Union and the United States in the
1992 Blair House Agreement on Agriculture
which prevented the UR from failing. This agree-
ment became possible, since shortly before the
EU-internal MacSharry Reform had paved the
way toward differentiating between price support
and direct compensatory payments. The Euro-
pean Union insisted on exempting these pay-
ments (like the US deficiency payments) from
eventual GATT commitments to gradually re-
duce the support calculated on the basis of ag-
gregate measure of support (AMS) as a prereq-
uisite for coming to a GATT agreement (for
more details see Tangermann 1998 and Swin-
bank 1999). Fourth, industrial countries includ-
ing the European Union have become interna-
tionally competitive exporters of specific agri-
cultural products, especially with a high value
added, and thus are interested in gaining access
to export markets. Hence, the mercantilist logic
of trade negotiations is also relevant for agricul-
ture: without reciprocity, no concessions. Fifth,
linked to the fourth aspect, there is a technology
argument. The emergence of technological in-
novations in food production, especially toward
genetically modified food, may open industrial
economies new markets either through direct
exports or through FDI. Given the R&D intensity
of such new goods, protection of investment and
of intellectual property rights will require agree-
ments on a bilateral, regional and multilateral
level. The latter is particularly important for
TRIPs, as many developing countries demand
the anchoring of property rights for genetic raw
materials deposited in their own resource base
such as tropical rain forests.
These are just the new issues discussed in
Section II which will also impact upon a tradi-
tional sector such as agriculture and which, un-
like in the past, will induce industrial econo-
mies to become more attentive to reducing bar-
riers to trade in agriculture.
In concrete terms, the MR will depart from
the UR commitments, which cover liberalisa-
tion measures in market access, domestic sup-
port and export subsidies. 1999 is the year
which was foreseen in the UR agreement on
agriculture as the starting point for new nego-
tiations. As regards market access, the target
will be cutting the tariff equivalents, which in
the UR were agreed upon as substitutes to vari-
able levies (EU) and other quantitative restric-
tions. However, a simple across-the-board cut
in the range of about one-third of the initial
level will not be effective due to the fact that
many tariff equivalents in industrial economies
are redundant ("water in the tariff' or so-called
dirty tariffication): the equivalents are higher
than differences between domestic and world16
market prices. Many developing countries
which apply much lower tariffs than those
which were bound in the UR still enjoy the
same manoeuvring space for tariffs without
having to fear competition. The solution could
be either the application of a non-linear tariff-
cutting formula like that in the Tokyo Round
when higher tariffs were lowered more strongly
than lower tariffs. This would have the advan-
tage of reducing tariff dispersion and bringing
effective rates of protection closer to the nomi-
nal rates. Another (more unlikely) possibility
would be such a high across-the-board cut that
tariff redundancy would disappear, and, thirdly,
Contracting Parties could negotiate to cut tariffs
for selected items to zero level as they negoti-
ated in information technology items (Anderson
et al. 1999). However, the latter would raise
tariff dispersion, as countries would prefer
duty-free trade for products which are not "sen-
sitive" while maintaining tariffs on items such
as sugar which are "sensitive". Thus, a non-lin-
ear tariff cut seems the best alternative viewed
from the allocative point of view. An escape
clause, which was negotiated as a special safe-
guard tariff-raising option when world market
prices were low or imports were high, will
probably also be tightened. It is important to
note that cutting tariffs reduces the volume of
imports for which price support in terms of fix-
ing intervention prices makes sense.
For a number of agricultural items meeting
the so-called minimum access requirement (part
of domestic sales must be provided by imports),
there are tariff quotas, i.e. tariffs within a cer-
tain quota are lower than above the quota. To
relax these quota by expanding them is likely to
meet resistance from those countries which
benefitted from guaranteed access in country-
specific quota. A far-reaching proposal to can-
cel tariff quota altogether and to agree on a non-
linear high tariff cut above the quota is the best
approach for improving market access. How-
ever, it is very unlikely to be achieved unless
industrial economies will be offered some off-
hands area which are exempted from a strict
removal of state interventions. Such an area
could be domestic support. As mentioned above,
the European Union and other industrial econ-
omies were exempted from the commitments to
include compensatory payments in the AMS
which became subject to reduction. Instead,
compensatory payments were placed in the
"blue box" outside the reduction commitments.
However, due to the fact that meanwhile the
United States decoupled their deficiency pay-
ments from production and shifted payments
from the blue to the green box, there is increas-
ing pressure upon the European Union as the
major "occupant" of the blue box to follow suit.
Tangermann (1998: 450) points out that with
these hitherto "blue box" measures included in
the AMS commitments, the EU domestic sup-
port payments would exceed the WTO limit al-
ready by year 2000. To be prepared for this
challenge in forthcoming WTO negotiations,
the European Union could either a priori cut its
price support and/or reduce compensatory pay-
ments or decouple payments from production
by binding the payments to the historical area
under cultivation (or to persons irrespective of
their employment in agriculture) rather than
stipulating how land must be used. Unfortu-
nately, the European Union in May 1999, when
deciding on the Agenda 2000, shied away from
both cutting intervention prices substantially
and decoupling income support from produc-
tion. Hence, the May 1999 Agenda 2000 de-
cisions leave the European Union much less
well prepared for the WTO negotiations than it
could have been the case. The argument to keep
bargaining chips for the forthcoming negotia-
tions instead of giving "everything away for
free" neither witnesses insight into the macro-
economic allocative distortions of agricultural
subsidies nor a realistic assessment of the de-
fensive role the European Union will have to
play in the WTO if there is no policy change.
Furthermore, this "wait and see" attitude will
deteriorate the chances the European Union has
in enforcing the "new issues" in agriculture to
the benefit of its competitive exporters.
The third traditional playing field in the
forthcoming MR negotiations in agriculture will
be export subsidies. The UR specified binding
maximum amounts for export subsidies both in
terms of budgetary expenditures (36 per cent
from the base period for industrial countries)17
and volumes (21 per cent for industrial coun-
tries). Due to higher international food prices
than in the base period, meeting the expenditure
limits did not pose a problem to the industrial
countries for the time being. They need less
subsidies to export products than in the past.
The binding constraint is the volume limit.
Again, Tangermann (1998: Tables 3 and 7) ex-
hibits the EU subsidies as the core challenge. In
a number of products, they account for more
than half of world entitlements to subsidies. In
1996/97 the European Union had already ex-
hausted these entitlements in terms of volumes
which would have been allowed by year 2000,
thus requiring downward adjustments until
2000. It can thus be expected that it is the ex-
port subsidy issue in which the European Union
will face the largest pressure from other Con-
tracting Parties and in which it will have the
least degree of manoeuvring space.
To summarise, the agricultural issue is a
melange of the three old stumbling block issues
(export subsidies, domestic subsidies and mar-
ket access) and the new stepping stone issues
like standards on technology, TRIPs, invest-
ment and environment. The European Union
has been overly passive during the first half of
1999 in overcoming the stumbling blocks and
thus risks to pay for this passive stance in terms
of missing chances in the stepping stones is-
sues. Though being an important and competi-
tive producer of technology-intensive agricul-
tural goods, the European Union still allows it-
self to be taken hostage in its policies by those
vested interests which would like to postpone
import market opening in non-competitive prod-
ucts to the latest moment possible.
2. Textiles: How Playing for Time
Erodes the Credibility of the
Trading Order
Together with agriculture, textile and clothing
has been the other sector which for many years
enjoyed special treatment outside the GATT
discipline, and like in agriculture, it was the UR
which set the milestone for the phase-out of
special treatment and special agreements. There
are no other sectors which are still as heavily
protected by above-average tariffs as agricul-
ture and textiles and clothing. However, unlike
in agriculture where the phase-out is still sub-
ject to uncertainties and is therefore open-
ended, the D-day for the end of special treat-
ment for textiles and clothing has already been
fixed: on January 1, 2005, in the final step of
four tranches, the Contracting Parties will have
to liberalise the remaining 49 per cent of trade
(measured in terms of 1990 import volume)
which hitherto was regulated under the Multifi-
bre Agreement. That means that within ten
years (1995-2005), the MFA with its categori-
sation of products and its bewildering array of
quotas and tariffs by categories of different de-
grees of "sensitivity" (in the case of the EU)
will disappear.
After 2005, textiles and clothing will be un-
der the same discipline of the WTO as tele-
phones and clocks. This is the clear letter and
spirit of the UR commitments. However, the
way of implementing the in-between steps of
liberalisation has given rise to strong doubts
whether the major importing countries spell
letters correctly and share the spirit behind the
wording of the UR. During the first two liber-
alisation sub-periods after starting in 1995,
these countries, notably the United States and
the European Union, have tried to side-step
commitments by both watering down and post-
poning the liberalisation process (Baugham et
al. 1997; Spinanger 1999: 458). Watering down
means that they include products never covered
by quotas into the liberalisation coverage in
order to have a broader sample of products
available for the liberalisation to start. With this
broader sample, countries have postponed the
liberalisation of "sensitive" products to the last
date possible, that is within the 49 per cent
group to be liberalised in 2005.
Playing for time has three consequences.
Each of them is detrimental for the trading sys-
tem. First, the full welfare impact of the UR is
seriously curtailed, since textile and clothing
account for a large share of the entire UR wel-
fare gains following CGE modelling.
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6 Second,
Spinanger (1999: Table 6) provides an overview of
CGE model-based welfare effects from the UR by18
the country group which from the very begin-
ning of the UR has been most sceptical about
liberalisation, the middle and lower-income de-
veloping countries, is just the group which
would benefit most strongly from the liberali-
sation of textiles and clothing. This holds be-
cause the current MFA system allows estab-
lished producers to capture rents and thus either
closes the door to the newcomers or only per-
mits them to participate by buying quotas.
Many middle and low-income developing coun-
tries are such newcomers. Hence, by playing for
time, industrial countries risk the re-emergence
of old North-South conflicts (as they already
showed up during the Singapore Ministerial),
new barriers against universal acceptance of the
trading system and finally a high mortgage for
the MR. Third, it cannot be excluded that by
postponing liberalisation of the most sensitive
products to the last date possible, industrial
countries deliberately create an import jam in
early 2005, which they could use to invoke and




Irrespective of whether or not these conse-
quences materialise, textiles and clothing will
keep its unrivalled position as the most heavily
protected industrial sector. This holds in par-
ticular for labour-intensive clothing with its
peak tariffs. Contingent protection measures
1
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such as anti-dumping will continue to be ap-
plied to this sector, and it is not unlikely that
real depreciation of Asian currencies after the
1997 crisis will be used as the starting point of
new contingent protection measures. Further-
more, instead of the former OMAs (orderly
marketing arrangements), OPAs (orderly pro-
duction arrangements) could begin to plague
this sector if industrial countries were to con-
centrate their early initiatives toward minimum
environmental and social standards in develop-
sectors. Shares differ significantly between the vari-
ous models but the consensus figure is about one-
third whereas the two other thirds of welfare effects
stem from liberalisation of agriculture and tariff dis-
mantling.
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing allows them
to invoke a so-called transitional safeguard clause for
the period until 2005.
1
8 Contingent protection measures will be discussed
below in Section III.6.
ing countries on this sector. While they would
have definitely chosen the wrong instrument,
unfortunately, they would have not chosen the
wrong sector, since problems of environmental
protection and labour standards emerge in this
sector like in a nutshell. Better instruments are
domestic policies rather than trade policies.
3. Regional Integration: Preventing
the Exception from Becoming the
Rule
Free trade areas and customs unions are grand-
father exceptions from the MFN- commitment.
With the second wave of mushrooming regional
integration schemes in the nineties (after the
first wave in the sixties), Art. XXIV GATT,
which specifies the conditions for a GATT-
consistent MFN exception, has become one of
the most frequently invoked GATT articles.
Many of the schemes launched by developing
countries are far from meeting the strict clauses
of Art. XXIV of liberalising "substantially" all
trade,
1
9 not to speak of the initial idea of the
GATT fathers that only countries should be
eligible for the exception from MFN which are
so deeply integrated with each other that they
were virtually subject to a single economic
policy. At that time, the analogy of political
federations was used, and, in fact, some of the
earliest schemes eligible for Art. XXIV were
colonial federations.
When dealing with the issue of compatibility
between multilateralism based on MFN and re-
gionalism, one is reminded of the fact that
compared to unilateralism this is an exercise in
the theory of the second best (Frankel et al.
1996: 52). To bring the second-best situation
close to the first-best requires the minimisation
of trade diversion, i.e. the shift from non-pre-
This is not to speak of non-operative blueprints of
ambitious bureaucracies sarcastically criticised by
Bhagwati (1997). Many of the developing countries'
schemes are notified under the special and differential
treatment clause ("Enabling Clause" of 1979) and
thus do not have to meet the Art. XXIV requirements
of forming a free trade area or a customs union within
due time for almost total trade. See for this notifica-
tion procedure WTO (1995).19
ferred to preferred trading partners due to dis-
criminatory treatment. It is trade diversion
which gives Contracting Parties the legitimacy
to file a dispute case because WTO benefits
have been multified and impaired by forming
regional integration schemes. All proposals to
discipline regional trading arrangements multi-
laterally focus on this target of minimising trade
diversion.
As concerns the proposals made in the past,
they can be listed into three categories: one
principally opposing such schemes ("trans-sys-
temic"), one going beyond the narrow frame-
work of Art. XXIV but still leaving regional in-
tegration schemes as a strategy allowed within
the trading system ("out-systemic") and the third
one staying within Art. XXIV ("in-systemic").
The "trans-systemic" proposals centre on roll-
back and standstill of regional integration, for
instance, by setting a sunset clause in Art. XXTV,
which would bring external tariffs down to the
internal tariffs within a time range (Bhagwati et
al. 1998: 1146). In the same vein, reportedly,
Srinivasan (WTO 1999b: 7) has argued in favour
of a sunset clause whereby preferences available
to members of regional agreements would be
extended to all WTO members within five years.
These radical proposals, which would also
include cancellation of Art. XXTV, are unlikely
to succeed given the existence and formation of
many integration schemes and the small number
of Contracting Parties in the WTO who as being
outside of any preferential scheme could credibly
and influentially promote such radical step.
2
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The "out-systemic" proposals have more le-
verage. First, they can depart from a natural
erosion of preferences by accelerating the re-
duction of MFN tariffs. With zero tariffs as
binding MFN tariffs, trade diversion (more
precisely, trade diversion based on tariffs)
would disappear. Ambitious proposals to drop
tariffs altogether early next century signal that
the "out-systemics" could benefit from a world-
wide liberalisation initiative. An institutional
proposal of "out-systemics" is to ban free trade
areas and to allow customs unions only. Nega-
tive effects for non-members from forming a
customs union would be completely ruled out
by following the additional provision that the
lowest pre-union national tariff serves as the
common external tariff (Bhagwati 1991: 77).
Customs unions have been found as welfare-su-
perior relative to free trade areas because they
the lack the rules of origin. Such rules designed
to counter trade deflection in a free trade area
formed by members with different external tar-
iffs are essentially protective and trade-divert-
ing (Lloyd 1993: 711; Krueger 1995). Further-
more, customs unions are found to enjoy en-
forcement advantages over free trade areas un-
der the mercantilist rule already cited above: no
reciprocity, no concession. They have market
power that enables them to threaten the multi-
lateral trading partners with setting higher tar-
iffs should such threat be desired (Bagwell and
Staiger 1998: 1179).
The "in-systemic" proposals centre on sharp-
ening the preconditions set by Art. XXTV for
GATT-consistent free trade areas and customs
unions. These preconditions comprise three as-
pects
21: the question of whether bound or ap-
plied tariffs are meant with the word "applicable
tariff, the meaning of the scope of liberalisation
as laid out in the provision that "substantially all
the trade" should be liberalised and thirdly the
definition of "other regulations of commerce"
applied to trade with non-members which should
not be higher or more restrictive than before the
scheme was formed.
The first aspect has become a focal point,
when Mexico raised applied tariffs on imports
from non-NAFTA members in the aftermath of
the December 1994 crisis within WTO-bound
ceilings while keeping applied tariffs on NAFTA
imports unchanged. The European Union felt
discriminated vis-a-vis the United States, since it
defined applicable tariffs as applied tariffs. The
pending issue is particularly relevant for devel-
oping countries, which have frequently bound
their tariffs to a higher level in the WTO frame-
work compared to the tariffs they actually apply.
The second aspect concerns the exclusion of
agricultural products in free trade arrangements
2
0 Among the large trading partners, it is only Japan
which is not a member of a preferential trading
scheme.
2
1 For a detailed discussion of these aspects, see
Nagarajan (1998).20
in the sense that part of trade must not be subject
to internal liberalisation. But which part? The
normal practice was that agricultural trade was
excluded. Yet, special treatment of agriculture is
inconsistent with the above-discussed trend to
treat agriculture in the world trading system like
other sectors. Reforms in this respect could have
substantial implications. By dropping the word
"substantially", the EU, for instance, would have
to revise their numerous bilateral "hub and
spoke"-type free trade agreements
2
2 in order to
include agricultural trade unless the exclusion in
past agreements would be "grandfathered" and
thus treated as a. fait accompli. It is obvious that
the EU would have difficulties to comply with
such a substantial reform.
2
3 The third aspect pri-
marily refers to preferential rules of origin in re-
gional trade agreements as well as to other regu-
lations of commerce such as variable levies or
anti-dumping duties (Sampson 1996). In some
cases, regional provisions do not refer to WTO
provisions as the binding provision and, actually,
deviate from the latter. It has been correctly
argued that special regional rules of origin
2
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could curtail third-country rights under the WTO
(Roessler 1993; Palmeter 1993).
In short, it cannot be denied that the "out-sys-
temic" proposals have much appeal as they
would automatically extinguish a number of
problems which are dealt with in "in-systemic"
proposals. The former proposals could follow
Bhagwati's.proposal to allow customs unions as
the only exception from MFN for newly founded
schemes and to fix a timetable during which the
lowest national tariff would have to be ap-
2
2 Hub-and-spoke agreements misleadingly suggest free
trade for the spoke. In fact, this holds only for trade
with the hub. Over the rest of the region, the spoke
becomes an outsider as there is no free trade between
the spokes. See Wonnacott (1996).
2
3 An alternative to dropping the word "substantially"
would be to quantify it in terms of minimum percent-
age of intra-regional trade to be liberalised such as 75
per cent (a figure mentioned by Bhagwati (1990)).
For a number of reasons which, for instance, refer to
inapproriate manoeuvring space for governments to
exclude "sensitive" sectors from liberalisation com-
mitments, this is unsatisfactory as well.
The European Union operates the most sophisticated
system of rules of origin such as the donor country
content or different "cumulation rules" in the hub-
and-spoke agreements with European transition coun-
tries and within the European Economic Area.
preached as the common external tariff. "Grand-
father" clauses could protect the established free
trade agreements with a sunset clause that also
these agreements should be converted into cus-
toms unions within a pre-specified timeframe. In-
ternal liberalisation could be approved by bind-
ing it to the commitment of external MFN-based
liberalisation in order to maintain the preference
margins and at the same time not to impair third-
country rights under the WTO.
Overall, with decreasing MFN tariffs and on-
going liberalisation of non-tariff barriers, Art.
XXIV is likely to lose much of its relevance. To
put it differently, Art. XXIV is devoted to coping
with problems of "old regionalism" in which
trade was the dominating issue. In contrast, the
"new regionalism" stresses the shift in relevant
issues from trade to investment and harmonisa-
tion of regulations and underlines that its emer-
gence has been due to the success of multilat-
eralism in removing tariff barriers on MFN basis
and not to its failure (Ethier 1998: 1161).
4. Special Treatment for Developing
Economies: Has Free-Riding
Helped the Free-Riders?
Throughout its history, the world trading sys-
tem influenced by the Havana Charter has paid
tribute to special treatment of economies in de-
velopment. Infant industry arguments were
considered in the 1947 GATT (Art. XVIII) and
elaborated further in the so-called Part IV Ex-
tension (Arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII) of 1965. They
allowed developing countries to opt out of
MFN liberalisation commitments, thus legiti-
mating the countries to protect their industries
more than would have been possible under full
participation in multilateral trade negotiations.
Moreover, industrial countries' tariff prefer-
ences for non-traditional products originating
from developing countries, the so-called Gen-
eralised System of Preferences (GSP), were in-
troduced in the early seventies and became ap-
proved in the GATT first through a ten-year
waiver and finally, in 1979, through the Enab-
ling Clause on "Differential and More Favour-
able Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Partici-21
pation of Developing Countries". It is the En-
abling Clause which today serves developing
countries as the permanent legal foundation for
being unequally treated within the trading sys-
tem. The term "fuller participation" in the En-
abling Clause is a misnomer. What it stands for
is actually the result of a deal: developing coun-
tries have an incentive to participate in trade
negotiations more actively than in the past only
if differential treatment continues to be guaran-
teed.
Economically, special treatment brings aid
aspects into an allocative framework. Develop-
ment and trade are two separate issues linked
together in a single institutional framework.
This is highly problematic again because of the
assignment problem, discussed above for the
link between environment and trade. There are
aid institutions with adequate instruments but
the WTO does not belong to them. It neither
has the appropriate instruments nor is the ap-
propriate institution for channelling public re-
sources to developing countries (either in terms
of industrial countries' tariff revenues foregone
or in terms of subsidising domestic industries
through infant industry protection).
The implications of special treatment for the
trading system have been far-reaching. First, 80
per cent of WTO members are developing econ-
omies and the consensus principle requires in-




thirds) majority voting, which is principally
possible, could mean that industrial countries
could easily be voted down. This would threat-
en the existence of the WTO. Second, devel-
oping countries enjoy special treatment in all
sub-aspects and special agreements under the
WTO roof, mostly in terms of longer transition
periods. Third, the UR created an additional
group of particularly privileged Contracting
Parties, the least-developed countries. The idea
behind this new grouping, namely to upgrade
the developing countries and to merge develop-
ing and industrial countries in order to confine
preferences to the poorest countries only, was
^ The controversies on agreeing to a new WTO Direc-
tor-General following Renato Ruggiero after March
1999 bear witness to this point.
well-intended but not good. There is no clear
distinction line between poor and poorest coun-
tries and hence arbitrariness will continue. Nor
will poor countries become more eager to parti-
cipate in the world trading system as equals be-
cause poorer countries receive more privileges.
It is more likely that members eligible for either
group will stick to their group-specific entitle-
ments.
The economic results from unequal treatment
have been disenchanting. Trade preferences of
industrial countries failed to compensate for
supply-side-originating disincentives to export
and additionally became a suitable tool for the
donors to divide and rule (Langhammer and
Sapir 1987; Bhagwati et al. 1998: 1145). Rent-
seeking was encouraged in the same way as
fuller participation of the poorest members was
discouraged. The African countries, for in-
stance, while enjoying the highest preferences
have largely refrained from committing them-
selves to binding trade liberalisation in the UR
and thus remain the most heavily protected
markets (Sorsa 1996). That means that the im-
plicit tax on exports through import taxation is
the highest for the poorest countries. This is a
result which flies in the face of those seeing
privileged treatment as a key to world market
integration.
At a High Level Symposium on Trade and
Development held by the WTO in March 1999
(WTO 1999b), the hesitancy of developing
countries in entering the Millennium Round
was discussed on the basis of the disappointing
opening of developed countries' markets since
the UR. While this can be confirmed following
the textiles and clothing debate, the mercantilist
tone underlying this argument is notable. In-
stead of following the many partial and general
equilibrium studies, which stress the importance
of welfare effects derived from the opening of
the own import market, developing countries
supported by NGOs and UNCTAD have argued
in favour of fully exploiting the options of
privileged access to developed countries' mar-
kets especially for the poorest countries. Pro-
posals to cut tariffs for least developed coun-
tries' exports to zero, for instance, seem to
oversee various hurdles, such as supply-side in-
duced disincentives to exports (due to "wrong"22
exchange rates), the incentives for developing
countries to bypass trade barriers by establish-
ing "screwdriver" factories with miniscule do-
mestic value added in least-developed countries
and the redundancy of preferences due to MFN
duty-free treatment.
A major impulse for the debate on develop-
ment and trade will come from the decision on
China's application for WTO membership. As
China is by far the largest and most competitive
developing country (and not a least-developed
country) some industrial countries have de-
manded that China should give up all claims for
privileged treatment under the Enabling Clause
(Anderson 1997: 764), especially the rights of
temporary import protection under the balance
of payments provision (Art.XII GATT) and the
infant industry protection following Art. XVIII
GATT. It is evident that invoking the two pro-
visions would largely erode all the benefits
WTO members are expecting to collect from
having freer access to the Chinese market.
Likewise, it is evident that China is a develop-
ing country and that giving up this claim as a
precondition for approving its application
would be a signal for the complete revision of
preferential treatment for developing countries.
Should China insist on this status and be never-
theless allowed to accede to the WTO, the de-
bate would very likely shift to the direction of
standstill and sunset clauses of preferential
treatment, probably with long transition periods
and some sort of compensation. This would be
a development which warrants support in order
to strengthen the responsibility of the WTO for
enforcing the non-discrimination principle in
international trade rather than being a widely
imperfect substitute to aid.
5. Tariffs: Abandoning the Evils of
Escalation and Non-Binding
One of the oldest impediments to international
trade is the unequal tariff treatment of sectors,
usually described as the positive escalation ef-
fect.
2
6 Tariffs increase with the stage of pro-
duction and thus effectively protect domestic
value added in downstream industries higher
than is shown by the nominal rate of protection.
It is the group of countries exporting "finishing
touch" labour-intensive manufactures which
primarily suffers from positive escalation.
These are basically the advanced developing
countries plus few low-income countries which
have managed to shape their trade policies from
import substitution strategies to a more neutral
incentive system. Interestingly, the culprits in
escalation are basically all WTO members: the
industrial countries as the major markets for
developing countries but also the developing
countries themselves and among them primarily
the low-income countries insisting on the va-
lidity of the infant-industry argument.
2
7
Whether or not escalation is still a pending
issue for the MR depends on the extent of its
dismantling in the UR. The GATT measured
the change in tariff escalation due to the UR by
the change in the absolute difference between
the tariffs at the higher and lower stages of
processing (GATT 1993: 28;1994: 14; Safadi
and Laird 1996: 1227).
2
8 Three stages were
used: raw materials, semi-manufactures and
finished goods.
The results are unambiguous. Tariff escala-
tion has declined but still continues to exist es-
pecially in the more advanced stages of pro-
duction. Disaggregated by stages, it has been
eliminated in the first stage of raw-material-
based products and even reversed for tropical
finished goods in the sense that tariff cuts on
finished goods were larger than those on goods
at the preceding stage (semi-manufactures). An
2" Negative escalation effects are possible if agriculture
and services are included as upstream industries. In
many countries, both sectors today still enjoy higher
protection than manufacturing industries which were
liberalised under the GATT rounds. If this discrep-
ancy continues, many manufacturing industries with
an export potential will become unable to materialise
this potential because of negative escalation: costly
inputs of services and agricultural goods will prevent
them from collecting the fruits of liberalisation in
manufactures.
2' For detailed analysis of low-income trade regimes
and their reforms, see Sharer (1998) and IMF (1998)
2° Following this definition, tariff escalation declines
when the absolute decline in the tariff on the more
processed good exceeds the absolute decline in the
tariff on the less processed good. A reduction in tariff
escalation as defined above is a sufficient condition
for a decline in the effective rate of protection when
tariffs are reduced.23
even more detailed analysis by major importing
countries has revealed some exceptions from
the general trend of de-escalation. This occurs if
the decline in intermediate-goods tariffs ex-
ceeds the decline in final goods tariffs. Rubber
in the European Union, Japan and the United
States, jute in Canada, the European Union and
the United States, lead in Japan and the United
States, zinc in Canada as well as hides, skins
and leather in Japan belong to those products
where escalation has increased (GATT 1994:
15). Hence, tariff escalation will remain on the
agenda.
While tariff escalation has been a traditional
conflict in South-North direction of trade, non-
binding of tariffs opens conflicts in North-
South direction. The industrial countries have
almost completely bound their tariffs (99 per
cent of their imports) while the developing
countries still have more than 40 per cent of
their imports unbound. In particular, Asian and
African economies have refrained from fully
surrendering the scope for tariff manoeuvring.
In addition, as mentioned above, many develop-
ing countries apply tariffs at much lower rates
than their bound tariffs. Both elements, un-
bound tariffs and the application of tariffs at
lower rates than the bound ones, inject an ele-
ment of uncertainty into the trading system.
One might be tempted to positively assess uni-
lateralism in terms of being released from the
WTO straightjacket of reciprocity. In fact, how-
ever, in a mercantilist world such unilateralism
can backfire. It opens the door to counter-uni-
lateralism from the industrial countries' side if
these countries should find developing coun-
tries' bound tariffs generally too high and non-
binding as a way to arbitrarily deny a guarantee
on market access. Hence, the MR should and
will aim at full tariff binding and convergence
of applied and bound tariffs to the benefit of
developing countries.
6. Non-Tariff Barriers: The Race be-
tween the Hare and the Hedgehog
In a legalist understanding of the trading sys-
tem, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) have been nar-
rowly defined as specific issues like quantita-
tive restrictions (now generally banned) or rules
on pre-shipment inspection. Remaining barriers
other than tariffs have been listed either under
specific agreements (technical standards, sub-
sidies, anti-dumping), under specific sectors
(agriculture, textiles and clothing) or under the
broad umbrella "market access". Yet, analyti-
cally, this fragmentation is not helpful as all
these barriers have a price equivalent impacting
upon the difference between domestic and
world market prices for different industries and
sectors. The example of the AMS approach in
agriculture could easily be extended to manu-
facturing. Given the tactical games in negotia-
tions, the fact that fragmentation impedes trans-
parency might not be a random outcome of so-
phisticated issues but a deliberately pursued
target in order to hide what can be called a hare-
hedgehog race: Parallel to the constructive de-
struction of old NTBs, a destructive build-up of
new NTBs is under way so that traders will face
new hurdles much faster than they expected to
see them after just having succeeded in over-
coming old ones.
With respect to NTBs in the MR, the priority
challenges will be to establish more discipline
in so-called contingent protection instruments.
These are trade measures the quantitative di-
mension of which is not known a priori like a
tariff or a quota. Their extent depends on the
outcome of an investigation either launched
against countries (countervailing duties, safe-
guards, for instance) or against companies (anti-
dumping). It is the latter measure which exem-
plarily can serve as the reason for the re-emer-
gence of a problem which seemed to have been
contained after the UR. The 1979 Tokyo Round
Anti-dumping Code was tightened with respect
to dumping margin calculations, injury deter-
mination, investigation procedures, specifica-
tion of de minimis provisions (determining a
threshold level for negligible injury), no ap-
proval for anti-circumvention measures, revi-
sion clauses in order to terminate anti-dumping
provisions etc. Yet, from an economic rather
than legal point of view, these reforms have
been marginal. Neither has a macroeconomic
impact analysis been negotiated in order to con-
sider interests of consumers and downstream24
industries injured by anti-dumping measures
against intermediates, nor were penalties ap-
proved for the case of unjustified complaints.
The misleadingly vague and subjective term "un-
fair", which accompanies anti-dumping action,
was not removed. Anti-trust authorities were
not called upon to comment on the competition
effects of anti-dumping measures, and no alter-
native to protective tariffs was offered (for in-
stance pure trade-adjustment assistance).
2
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What is worse is the increase of anti-dump-
ing measures after the conclusion of the UR and
the wider geographical coverage of such meas-
ures. Since 1995 developing countries have —
after passing their own WTO-based anti-dump-
ing legislation — been applying anti-dumping
measures faster than the industrial countries.
This could well stimulate the four main initia-
tors (United States, European Union, Canada
and Australia)
3
0 to introduce more such meas-
ures (Spinanger 1998).
Apart from the contingent protection meas-
ures, non-tariff barriers find ideal breeding con-
ditions to mushroom in technical standards in-
cluding health and phytosanitary standards. En-
deavours toward "deep" integration like in the
EU Single Market, but to some extent also within
a "shallow" scheme like NAFTA normally lead
to harmonisation of measures at a higher level,
and only rarely can third countries choose be-
tween different national standards which are mu-
tually recognised among the member states of
such schemes.
As in all other rounds, non-tariff barriers will
be dealt with in the above-discussed fragmented
way of different agreements. This impedes cross-
comparisons and compatibility. It would be a
useful effort to launch studies intended to quan-
tify an AMS in selected non-agricultural prod-
ucts combining the most important NTBs in a
single price equivalent. But even then the hare-
hedgehog race cannot be won. The scope of
non-tariff barriers seems like space: indefinite
and all the more expanding, the more barriers
are identified and made transparent.
2
9 For detailed discussion of the UR reforms and deeper
reform proposals, see Leidy (1994).
3" The order reflects the ranking in terms of measures in
force in 1997 (Spinanger 1998: Table 1).
7. Universality: What Is a New
Round Worth without China?
By mid-1999, thirty countries having applied
for WTO membership are at various stages of
negotiating the terms of their accession.
3
1 Some
of them, such as Algeria and China, first ap-
plied for membership more than ten years ago.
The applicants, including the "Big Three"
China, Russia and Saudi Arabia, account for
about 9 per cent of world merchandise exports,
7 per cent of world merchandise imports, 30 per
cent of world population and about 5 per cent of
world GDP (at current exchange rate). Hence,
while many applicants, being island states or
successor states of the former Soviet Union, are
rather unimportant in world trade, the aggregate
weight of the applicants is not negligible due to
China.
It has been criticised that the procedures for
application have been arbitrary, double-stan-
dard driven, lengthy, cumbersome, intranspar-
ent, volatile and very much influenced by the
WTO consensus principle. Co-optation to the
WTO requires the approval of all major trading
partners, and this is a particular problem with
respect to China whose economic and political
weight seems to have become more a stumbling
block than a building block for accession. In a
nutshell, all uncertainties and volatilities of
policy-making in a transition and developing
country are concentrated in China, as has been
shown exemplarily above for the free-riding
conduct of China as a developing country. For
Russia, it is "only" the transition aspect of se-
vere shortcomings in market-based institution
building which seems to be the most formidable
barrier.
As long as the accession problem is not
solved, for China (and to a lesser extent for
Russia) the MR cannot be labelled "universal"
or "global" since non-members do not enjoy the
legal protection of non-discrimination. In fact,
there is blunt discrimination against non-mem-
bers as concerns quota restrictions and anti-
dumping provisions. On the other hand, the
benefits of the MR are seriously curtailed if
3 This sub-section draws on Langhammer and Liicke
(1999) and the literature discussed there.25
China cannot be committed to comply with the
WTO rules. To put it differently, China's WTO
membership would be the most significant
example of "tying hands internationally" for a
single economy in the post-war period. Un-
fortunately, in the mercantilist world in which
the WTO operates, WTO accession of impor-
tant trading countries is always linked to losses
in economic rents for competing countries. In
the short run, developing countries like India
have reason to fear the erosion of rents, for
instance in trade in textiles and clothing, al-
though the long-term benefits weigh more. Fur-
thermore, NGOs exert pressure upon govern-
ments to demand far-reaching political reforms
from the applicants to be implemented prior to
accession. This has led to frustration on the ap-
plicants' side fuelled by the resistance of do-
mestic interest groups, which for selfish reasons
have opposed WTO membership. In such a stale-
mate situation, it is possible that a new round
starts without having solved the accession issue.
This could lead to a situation of rebus sic stan-
tibus, i.e. applicants could withdraw from their
applications if the members would demand
more concessions prior to accession following
the MR proposals for deeper liberalisation. It is
this "moving goal post" situation (already being
in force) which could seriously impede progress
in accession negotiations. It could make the MR
much less meaningful than it could be with the
MR starting from a truly universal position with
China as a member.
IV. On Strategies: The Political
Economy of Disciplined
Mercantilism
1. The US Strategy: Focusing the
Millennium Round on Preferred
Topics
The GATT has a long record of struggling with
mercantilism, and there is no evidence that at
the eve of a new round the WTO will be ex-
empted from such a struggle. Securing access to
export markets and curtailing foreign govern-
ment practices that could give imports in do-
mestic markets an advantage have been and are
major negotiation targets for each Contracting
Party. The reciprocity requirement and the
MFN principle are responsible for the conver-
sion of mercantilist attitudes into welfare gains
and for a wide geographical spread of such
gains.
Sharing the same philosophy of "exports first
and imports second" does not mean that Con-
tracting Parties agree on strategies. In fact, they
do not, and this is fairly obvious given different
specialisation profiles of their economies.
To begin with the United States, identifying a
mid-1999 strategy is hampered by the fact that
the President by that time had not yet sought to
get an approval from Congress for a fast-track
negotiating authority. This is not a unique situa-
tion just a few months before the Third WTO
Ministerial, since such a mandate did not exist
in 1986 when the UR was launched and was
approved only one and half years later when ne-
gotiations were already underway. However,
given that Republican fast-track negotiating
authority proposals failed twice in Congress be-
tween 1997 and early 1999, there is some rea-
son to assume that the US legislative body is di-
vided over what issues the President should con-
centrate on in his negotiation strategy. While
the Republicans have continued to concentrate
on traditional market-access issues like tariffs,
the Democrats (jointly with NGOs and orga-
nised labour) are determined to give similar at-
tention to the new issues like environment, so-
cial standards and investment.
3
2 With a wide-
ning current account deficit, opposition against
a new round has gained momentun in the
United States, thus making it unlikely that Con-
gress will approve a fast-track mandate just in
time when the Third WTO Ministerial starts.
3
2 The two views have been clearly exposed in the ad-
dresses given by Rep. Gephardt, US House of Repre-
sentatives minority leader on the one hand, and Senator
Roth, Republican Chairman of the Finance Committee
on the other hand. The addresses were given at the
Economic Strategy Institute Conference on April28,
1999 (Internet-address: http://usis-israel.org.il/publish/
press/congress/archive/1999/April/).26
Overall, the US administration so far has re-
vealed few priority topics which were also ex-
posed in bilateral US-EU discussions on trade
facilitation: a further reduction of industrial
tariffs, the removal of high tariffs and subsidies
in agriculture, the expansion in coverage of
GATS and the Government Procurement Agree-
ment and the strengthening enforcement of
TRIPs (Morici 1999). This sectoral focus on
agriculture, some services (preferably financial
and audio-visual services) and government pro-
curement mirrors US export interests as well as
a continuation of the approach to pick up spe-
cific industries as front-runners in liberalisation
which was started with the information technol-
ogy products after the UR conclusion. Within
the industrial sector, a sectoral focus has also
been displayed in proposals which were sug-
gested within the Asia Pacific Economic Coop-
eration Group (APEC) as so-called early volun-
tary sectoral liberalisation (EVSL).
3
3 This sug-
gestion was made by the United States in order
to initiate a liberalisation momentum for the
2010 Bogor target of free trade among APEC's
advanced member states. As a result of APEC's
self-understanding as a non-discriminatory ar-
rangement, internal liberalisation within APEC
would be extended to non-APEC members,
subject to the reciprocity requirement (condi-
tional MFN). Any group action of APEC would
thus automatically become a subject of WTO
negotiations under the Millennium Round.
Economic costs of sectoral liberalisation are
evident. Unequal treatment of sectors could
lead to diverging effective rates of protection
between sectors and trigger misallocation (Dee
et al. 1998). Non-sensitive ("easy") sectors
would be liberalised first, sensitive sectors later.
This would create an adjustment jam and fur-
ther ground for special treatment (see above for
Initially, the list of designated sectors for EVSL com-
prised fifteen industrial sectors (Yamazawa 1998).
However, as no consensus could be achieved con-
cerning implementation, the 1998 Kuala Lumpur
Ministerial Meeting of APEC reduced the list to eight
sectors to be pursued in the WTO. Yet, given the non-
committing forms of cooperation within APEC, the
Kuala Lumpur Meeting stated also that APEC mem-
bers while expanding the EVSL beyond APEC would
not be restricted in their freedom to act independently
in the WTO negotiations (EC 1999: 4).
the discussion of playing-for-time strategies in
the textiles and clothing sector). Finally, focus-
ing on agriculture and special services as US
"pet" liberalisation sectors can easily lead the
negotiations into an early deadlock, since trad-
ing partners would oppose sector-specific ne-
gotiations.
2. The EU Strategy: Toward a
"Comprehensive" Round
The EU Commission has already set out its pre-
ferred approach to the MR (EU Commission
1999). It calls for a so-called comprehensive
round similar to the UR and rejects a narrow sec-
toral approach. Explicitly, the two critical sec-
tors agriculture and services are exposed when
the latter approach is criticised. Broad negotia-
tions should be time-bound, and results should
already be achieved after three years, since —
unlike in the previous round when the GATT
was integrated into the WTO — no systemic
questions would be expected to arise this time.
Apart from the broad coverage of issues to be
discussed, the EU pleads for considering devel-
opment aspects in more depth than before. This
includes special treatment for least-developed
countries (tariff-free treatment of essentially all
industrialised countries' imports from them),
assistance to capacity building in developing
countries in order to trigger more participation
in the WTO (Michalopoulos 1999), better coher-
ence in different institutional settings (WTO
and the Bretton Woods institutions) and, final-
ly, better operationalisation of special and dif-
ferential treatment. It is evident that the Euro-
pean Union seeks to draw developing countries
on its side and that the EU challenge to find a
WTO-compatible solution for reconciling pref-
erential relations with low-income developing
countries (Lome Agreement) is reflected in its
proposals. In short, the European Union con-
tinues the melange between aid and trade as-
pects in spite of critics from economic quarters.
In a sectoral view, the EU has announced its
defence of blue box measures. That would
mean that compensatory payments would re-
main outside the AMS definition and thus27
would not be subject to reductions. The renewal
of the so-called peace clause in agriculture be-
yond 2003 is important for the European Union,
since it would protect subsidies compatible with
the Agreement on Agriculture against WTO-
internal claims to dismantle them. Finally, the
"multifunctional" role of agriculture which the
European Union would like to see accepted
aims at getting WTO endorsement for subsidies
which following the European Union are still
necessary to enable the agricultural sector to
meet social and environmental functions in
rural areas.
As concerns services, the European Union
clearly pursues the bottom-up approach (see
Section II. 1 above). This approach acknowl-
edges the peculiarity and hence sensitivity of
individual service sectors and links further mar-
ket opening to regulatory discipline. In reading
the EU proposals, the development of a trans-
parent and predictable regulatory environment
seems at least as important as the opening of
markets.
Quantifiable proposals of the EU include the
harmonisation of tariff levels in non-agricul-
tural products with three tariff bands (low, me-
dium and high level), but again subject to
flexibility according to the development level
of partner countries and according to the sensi-
tivity of sectors. Furthermore, the European
Union still sees "trade defence" measures (in-
cluding anti-dumping measures) as a necessary
instrument to implement its export interests.
Under non-quantifiable proposals, calls for in-
ternational frameworks concerning competition,
investment, environment and core labour stan-
dards can be mentioned.
Overall, the EU proposals mirror its tradi-
tional strategy to merge distribution and alloca-
tion targets and to burden all trade-related as-
pects of other issues upon WTO shoulders.
Concessions to open markets are qualified with
respect to domestic interests (sensitivity, non-
economic issues) as well as presumed foreign
interests (better treatment of developing coun-
tries). Hence, the proposals are open to critics
concerning the assignment problem (non-sepa-
ration of allocation and distribution targets) and
the watering of trade liberalisation. Evidently,
the target to make a new round "comprehen-
sive" also reflects EU-internal problems of ris-
ing heterogeneity. This is partly due to forth-
coming enlargement, but also due to different
economic structures emerging through the deep-
ening of integration. Risking more "incompre-
hensiveness" in terms of a more narrow but eco-
nomically more coherent approach seems to have
been non-reconcilable with the current political
mainstream.
3. The Developing Countries: Hesi-
tancy Can Become a Strategy
The role of developing countries in the world
trading system is bound to increase as there is
no industrial country left outside the WTO
while all prospective members including China
are either from the developing world or are in
transition to either industrial or developing
countries. Even with the consensus principle
still prevailing in WTO decision-making, devel-
oping countries can no longer be ignored. This
fact has found acceptance in the label used by
many observers of the 1999 WTO High Level
Symposium on Trade and Development for the
next round: Development Round (WTO 1999b).
Both the European Union and the United
States have already paid tribute to this role by
linking a number of countries to them through
hub-and-spoke trade agreements. The European
Union has been the forerunner through its myr-
iad of bilateral and regional preferential inte-
gration schemes in the Mediterranean and
Africa. The United States has followed late but
is now propagating a Free Trade Area of the
Americas and APEC, both departing from
NAFTA and the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement as core schemes. The geo-
graphically clear separation between the Ameri-
cas and the Eurafricas has recently been broken
by the renewed interest of the United States in
African countries' natural resource potential on
the one hand and the designs of free trade
agreements between the European Union and
Mercosur and between the European Union and
Mexico on the other hand. Such "Spaghetti
bowl or criss-crossing of preferences", as28
Bhagwati et al. (1998) have correctly labelled
this development, can undermine the effective-
ness, credibility and enforceability of the multi-
lateral trading system, should the developing
countries believe that more benefits could be
collected from regional than from multilateral
agreements.
Unfortunately, both the lack of implementing
the UR and the systemic flaw of GATT/WTO to
mix aid with trade issues have made developing
countries at best hesitant to agree on a new round
and at worst hostile to do so. Hesitancy and
hostility are rooted in the lack of UR implemen-
tation of textiles and clothing liberalisation, the
continuation of anti-dumping procedures, the
existence of peak tariffs and tariff escalation, the
pressure (as seen by developing countries) to
comply with industrial countries' standards on
environment, investment, labour and competi-
tion, the protectionist abuse of rules of origin and
the ongoing protectionism in agriculture. What
adds to these complaints is the inherent fear of
developing countries to be overrun by leapfrog-
ging improvements in technology, including serv-
ices and agriculture. Finally, special and differ-
ential treatment traditionally rules the way many
developing countries' policymakers perceive the
WTO. Regrettably, political constraints facing
the WTO chief officials have prevented them
from calling the presumed fruitful melange be-
tween trade and aid issues in the WTO what it
actually is: a chimera.
3
4 Such constraints may in-
clude the growing importance of NGOs, many of
which simply disagree with the straightforward
nexus between more trade and higher economic
growth.
34 Such constraints become visible when the former WTO
Director-General Ruggiero mentions "...the wide con-
sensus that trade liberalisation was not on its own
sufficient for development" (WTO 1999b: 9) without
mentioning that without trade liberalisation, there
would be hardly any development at all. Likewise,
empirical evidence rejects those who argue that special
preferences for least-developing countries would be
helpful. They would either trigger transhipment of
components from advanced developing countries to
least-developing countries to circumvent trade barriers
against more advanced developing countries and con-
sequently would induce donor countries to meticulous-
ly check origin certificates in order to discourage such
transhipment. Alternatively, special treatment would be
obsolete because of supply-side-induced obstacles to
exports from least-developing countries.
Interestingly, economists like Srinivasan, re-
portedly have supported developing countries'
hesitancy in entering a new round by pointing
to the many pending issues in the implementa-
tion record of the UR (WTO 1999b: 7).
At first glance, it seems that the focus of
many developing countries on a more even dis-
tribution of the gains from trade liberalisation
as highlighted in the WTO Symposium could
lead to a stalemate situation in the pre-stage of
the Millennium Round. Yet, hesitancy for
whatever reasons can also have a positive pay-
off for the new round. In many cases, gains are
unevenly distributed simply because they could
not materialise at all. The current system with-
out full UR implementation favours few rela-
tively advanced developing countries collecting
rents from their position as established produc-
ers relative to the lower-income newcomers.
Should hesitancy favour the acceleration of UR
implementation, including trade facilitation and
the dismantling of obsolete technical barriers to
trade, poorer countries would be among the
main beneficiaries.
However, even with such gains, many devel-
oping countries will continue to hesitate follow-
ing the bicycle theory of keeping the world
trade policy engine going (Bergsten 1999). The
reason is simple: To esteem the achievements of
trade liberalisation requires a thinking in coun-
terfactuals, i.e. what would happen without
open markets. For many policymakers in devel-
oping countries, it is still unperceivable that this
counterfactual would have shown a much worse
situation for their countries than the actual one.
V. Outlook: Technology Beats
Tactics
All preceding multilateral rounds (like all
rounds on "disarmament") were characterised
by periods of standstill and leapfrogging, by de-
liberately planned delays in negotiations and
likewise planned accelerations, by withdrawals
from offers of concessions and by threats, in
short: by tactical games. Understandably, the
entire toolbox of cooperative and non-coopera-29
tive games and the underlying theory found an
excellent playing field in the world of disci-
plined mercantilism or — coined more neutrally
— trade diplomacy. It is a safe bet that the MR
will see similar endeavours of trade diplomats
as before. Yet, whether the endeavour will be
crowned by success is no longer sure for two
reasons.
First, in the trade in "visibles" (goods), the
pro-trade lobby groups have gained in enforce-
ment capabilities. In agriculture, the shift from
price to income support has made the extent of
subsidies transparent and politically less de-
fendable. Producers are increasingly divided over
their stance toward international trade due to
their different affiliation to processing interme-
diates or producing import-competing goods, or
to landless or landrich farmers. Consumers de-
mand goods locally which they have consumed
abroad as visitors, for instance. Budget con-
straints have put a cap on subsidy expansion.
Moreover, R&D investment in processed agri-
cultural products have made just those countries
internationally competitive which traditionally
have adhered to restrictive trade policies. They
now learn the lesson of reciprocity: without own
concessions, there are no concessions on the ex-
port side either. Yet, the most important driving
force towards freer trade in visibles is the success
of learning in those sectors which indirectly were
discriminated against because of subsidies paid
to the protected sectors.
3
5 This success makes
competition for subsidies much less clearer in
outcome for the hitherto protected sectors than in
the past.
Second, in the trade in "invisibles" (services),
unprecedented technological progress opens the
door to first-mover advantages which the benefi-
ciaries will defend against those who would like
to regulate and contain trade in invisibles for var-
ious reasons. With innovations coming first to
stimulate cross-border trade and regulations com-
ing later to control such trade, one is reminded of
the hare-hedgehog race. What matters is that the
borderline between invisibles and visibles be-
comes porous as seen in the e-commerce debate
on goods versus services. To some extent, serv-
ices can be defined as goods and vice versa or
can be substituted for one another. It is in this
trade primarily where technology beats tactics.
Still, however, there is no golden age of un-
limited trade even if the trade diplomats were
only to seal what traders had already achieved.
Particularly, many NGOs are concerned about
real and emotional negative spillovers concern-
ing environmental and labour standards, and
they are no longer political light-weights. Un-
like in the past, their role in the MR has been
politically accepted. Some developing countries
fear to be marginalised in the trade and technol-
ogy nexus and hence are more sympathetic to
regulations and special treatment than others.
Though both players are far from being natural
allies, they will sit close to the brake lever in
the MR. And finally, there is the immobile fac-
tor of unskilled labour in industrial countries,
gaining as consumer but eventually losing as
wage earner. How he defines himself and how
he succeeds to form cross-border pressure
groups, this will decide on whether the pro-
traders will have a home game or an away game
in the MR.
35 A few years ago, for instance, the German industry
raised in open debate the question on the bill they had
to pay in terms of resources foregone because of
protection conceded to the agricultural sector.References
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